Experimental evidence suggests that human decisions involve a mixture of self-interest and internalized social norms which cannot be accounted for by the Nash equilibrium behavior of Homo Oeconomicus. This led to the notion of strong reciprocity (or altruistic punishment) to capture the human trait leading an individual to punish norm violators at a cost to himself.
Homo oeconomicus versus homo reciprocans
The assumption of self-interest as a motivation for social and economic behavior is widely used as a guiding principle for social modeling. In a game theory context the idea of maximization of self-interest leads to the notion of (noncooperative) Nash equilibrium. A strategy is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his payoff by changing his strategy, when the strategies of the other players are fixed. Given any environment situation, in a Nash equilibrium solution, each player tries to maximize his gains regardless of what happens to the other players. It is the rational expectations attitude of what has been called the Homo oeconomicus, a notion which is at the basis of many theoretical economics constructions. Whether this is a realistic notion when applied to human societies is an important issue. Experiments have been carried out and, in many cases, when played by human players, games have outcomes very different from the Nash equilibrium points. An interesting case is the ultimatum game [1] . A simplified version of this game is the following:
One of the players (the proposer P ) receives 100 coins which he is told to divide into two non-zero parts, one for himself and the other for the other player (the responder R). If the responder accepts the split (R 0 ), it is implemented. If the responder refuses (R 1 ), nothing is given to the players. Consider, for example, a simple payoff matrix corresponding to two different proposer offers (P 0 and P 1 ) R 0 R 1 P 0 a, c 0, 0 P 1 b, b 0, 0 (1) with a ≫ c, a + c = 2b (for example a = 99, c = 1, b = 50).
The unique Nash equilibrium is (P 0 , R 0 ), corresponding to the payoffs (a, c). However, when the game is played with human players, such greedy proposals are most often refused, even in one-shot games where the responder has no material or strategic advantage in refusing the offer. Based on this and similar results in other situations (public goods games, etc), Bowles and Gintis [2] [3] developed the notion of strong reciprocity (Homo reciprocans [4] ) as a better model for human behavior. Homo reciprocans would come to social situations with a propensity to cooperate and share but would respond to selfish behavior on the part of others by retaliating, even at a cost to himself and even when he could not expect any future personal gains from such actions. This should be distinguished from cooperation in a repeated game or reciprocal altruism or other forms of mutually beneficial cooperation that can be accounted for in terms of self-interest.
The same authors, in collaboration with a group of anthropologists, conducted a very interesting "ultimatum game experiment" in many small-scale societies around the world [5] . Homo oeconomicus is rejected in all cases and consistently different results are obtained in different societies, the players' behavior being strongly correlated with existing social norms and the market structure in their societies. This and other experiments [6] [7] strongly suggest that human decision problems involve a mixture of self-interest and a background of (internalized) social norms [8] [9] .
Strong reciprocity is a form of altruism [10] in that it benefits others at the expense of the individual that exhibits this trait. Monitoring and punishing selfish agents or norm violators is a costly (and dangerous) activity without immediate direct benefit to the agent that performs it. It would be much better to let others do it and to reap the social benefits without the costs.
Strong reciprocator agents contribute more to the group than selfish ones and they sustain the cost of monitoring and punishing free-riders. For this reason it was thought that the strong reciprocity trait could not invade a population of self-interested agents, nor could it be maintained in a stable population equilibrium. To counter this belief, Bowles and Gintis [3] developed a simple (mean-field type) model that might apply to the structure of the small hunter-gatherer bands of the late Pleistocene. Taking the view that the strong reciprocity trait has a genetic basis, this would be a period long enough to account for a significant development in the modern human gene distribution. The model would give an evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon. Of course, if instead of gene-based, strong reciprocity is culturally inherited, emergence and (or) modification of this trait could be much faster.
Because I intend to explore the influence of the social (network) structure on the evolution of strong reciprocity, I will start by discussing a simplified version of the Bowles-Gintis model. The main simplification is that migration in and out of the evolving group to an outside pool of agents is not considered. The consideration of these migrations may be of interest for a realistic picture of the hunter-gatherer bands of the Pleistocene, but not for the general picture of strong reciprocity in a wider society. By simplifying and somewhat enlarging the punishment scenario (beyond ostracism) of the Bowles-Gintis model and framing it as a replicator one-dimensional map, a clear view is obtained of its dynamical aspects.
2 Emergence of strong reciprocity. The Bowles-
Gintis model
One considers a population of size N with two species of agents, one denoted reciprocators (R-agents) and the other self-interested (S-agents). In a public goods activity each agent can produce a maximum amount of goods q at cost b (with goods and costs in fitness units). The benefit that an S-agent takes from shirking public goods work is the cost of effort b (σ), σ being the fraction of time the agent shirks. The following conditions hold
Furthermore q (1 − σ) > b (σ) so that, at every level of effort, working helps the group more than it hurts the worker. For b (σ) one chooses
which satisfies the constraints (2). R-agents never shirk and punish each free-rider at cost cσ, the cost being shared by all R-agents. For an S-agent the estimated cost of being punished is sσ, punishment being ostracism or some other fitness decreasing measure. s is the weight given by an S-agent to the punishment probability. It may or may not be the same as the actual fitness cost of punishment. Each S-agent chooses σ (the shirking time fraction) to minimize the function
f being the fraction of R-agents in the population, f σ is the probability of being monitored and punished. The last term is the agent's share of his own production. The value σ S that minimizes B (σ) is
The contribution of each species to the population in the next time period is proportional to its fitness given by
for S-and R-agents. The baseline fitness is zero, that is, π S,R = max π ′ S,R , 0 . The first term in both π ′ S and π ′ R is the benefit arising from the produced public goods and the second term the work effort. The last terms represent the fitness cost of punishment for S-agents and the cost incurred by R-agents. γ = 1 corresponds to ostracism from the group, other values to general coercive measures affecting the fitness of S-agents. The last term in π ′ R emphasizes the collective nature of the punishment. Notice however the improbable heavy punishing burden put on reciprocators when in small number.
Finally one obtains 1 a one-dimensional map for the evolution of the fraction of R-agents marginally stable fixed points. For smaller γ the region between f A and f B (where Π S − Π R is negative) disappears and only the marginally stable fixed points remain. In both cases the asymptotic behavior corresponds either to f = 0 (and σ S = 1) or to f between 0 and 1 but σ S = 0. That is, in this second case, both reciprocators and shirkers remain in the population but shirkers choose not to shirk because the minimum of B (σ) is at σ S = 0.
For an initial f smaller than f A the fraction of reciprocators falls very rapidly to zero. This reflects the (maybe unrealistic) fact that in this case a very small number of reciprocators has to carry the burden of punishing very many shirkers.
Hence, from the point of view of intragroup dynamics, either reciprocators are completely eliminated from the population or they remain in equilibrium with a probably large number of shirkers, which do not shirk for fear of being punished. Therefore intragroup dynamics, by itself, cannot explain how the reciprocator attitude might have become a dominant trait. However when very many groups are considered, for example assembled at random from a pool containing both reciprocators and shirkers [11] [12] , then only the groups that contain at the start a fraction f greater than f A will have in the end a nonzero fitness. In all others, S-agents invade the population and suffer a "tragedy of the commons" situation with final zero fitness. Therefore from an intergroup dynamics perspective the groups with reciprocators tend to dominate and impose an above average predominance of the reciprocator trait.
Although the model, together with intergroup dynamics, explains why strong reciprocity is an adaptive trait [13] , the marginally stable nature of the (above f B ) fixed points also suggest that the shirker trait is never eliminated and will remain in the population.
Small independent groups assembling and disassembling is a likely scenario for the development of the reciprocator trait. In this sense the huntergatherer bands of the Pleistocene might have indeed provided the appropriate environment for the evolution of the trait, whether gene-coded or culturallyinherited.
It is well known that group size affects monitoring in public goods provision [14] . Therefore, a natural question is what happens when, later on, the Pleistocene reciprocators and their fellow shirkers become imbedded into a larger society. Monitoring and punishment of shirkers by reciprocators necessarily looses its global collective nature. Once monitoring looses its global nature, it becomes the business of the neighbors of the shirker. In addition to the individual cost of monitoring and (or) punishing free-riders, such punishing requires an amount of force that, in particular, insures the effectiveness of the punishment and on the other hand puts the punisher safe from direct retaliation from the violator. This is one of the reasons for the creation of central authorities for this purpose. However if central authorities have enough force to implement punishment without retaliation, they are at times quite ineffective at monitoring. Also laws and central authorities, on the role of reciprocators play, a role in the control of serious offenses, but not so much on the day to day monitoring of public goods work. Therefore in a large society the nature of the control performed by the neighbors is certainly going to play a role on the evolution of the reciprocator trait.
If the trait is genetically encoded, maybe the wider societies developed by modern man had no time to make significant changes on its structure. However if it is (at least in part) culturally inherited then a much shorter time scale may be involved. What about the big city tales of a guy being mugged in full daylight while a crowd of passersby moves along quite indifferent to the event? Is it the (1 − f ) remnants of non-reciprocators in the population or are we watching the emergence of Homo Oeconomicus in his full glory? Or is it something else?
Network dependence of strong reciprocity
To explore the possible effect of the social network structure on the evolution of strong reciprocity I will consider a agent-based model, which later on will be interpreted in a mean field sense similar to the model in Section 2.
As before one considers R-agents and S-agents and the monitoring function performed by R-agents is kept at the neighbors level. However punishment is only implemented if at least two neighbors are willing to do so. It is the same as to say that punishing a norm-violator cannot be an individual action, but requires a minimal social power and consensus. The need to be close to monitor and the need for agreement of at least two neighboring reciprocators to implement punishment, immediately suggests that the structure of the network is going to play a role on the evolution of the group. The following is the mathematical coding of this idea:
As before one has two agent species (S-agents and R-agents), the fraction of R-agents being f . The agents are placed in a network where, on average, each agent is connected to k other agents. k is called the degree of the network. To the whole population of dimension N one associates 3 N−dimensional vectors, W k, P u, Cpu. W k is called the work vector, P u the punishment vector and Cpu the cost of punishment vector.
The link structure of the network is chosen as in the β−model of Watts and Strogatz [15] [16] . Starting from a regular ring structure where each node is symmetrically connected to its k closest neighbors, each link is examined in turn and, with probability β, replaced by a random link to some other node in the network.
At time zero, f N R-agents and (1 − f ) N S-agents are placed at random in the network. The local neighborhood of agent i, that is the set of other agents connected to i, is denoted Γ i . The entries of the vectors W k, P u, Cpu are then computed as follows:
, where n R (i) is the number of R-agents connected to this S-agent, n R (i) = # {j : j ∈ R, j ∈ Γ i } # For the P u vector R-agents; P u (i) = 0 S-agents; P u (i) = n P (i) (1 − W k (i)), where n P (i) is the number of pairs of R-agents in Γ i which are also neighbors among themselves, n P (i) =
# For the Cpu vector R-agents;
is the number of times that the agent i is in a R-pair punishing an S-agent k,
Summarizing: Each reciprocator, on detecting an S-agent k, looks for another reciprocator in his own neighborhood also connected to k. If he finds one he punishes k by an amount proportional to the fraction of shirking. An S-agent may be punished several times by all different pairs of reciprocators in his neighborhood.
The amount of work that an S-agent does is inversely proportional to the number of reciprocators in his neighborhood. However lack of communication between neighboring reciprocators may make the probability of punishment much smaller.
The (average) fitness of R-agents and S-agents is
The baseline fitness is zero, that is
Once the fitness is computed the replicator equation
is applied and a new cycle starts with a new random distribution, on the network, of Nf new R-agents and N (1 − f new ) S-agents. Running this agent model for several values of β and, in each case, for random initial f 0 's one finds two separate regions in the (f 0 , β) plane (Fig.3) . In region 1 the evolution drives f towards zero as well as the overall fitness π (Example in Fig.4a 
In region 2 there is an asymptotic nonzero value for f and for the fitness (Example in Fig.4b ).
As β increases it becomes less likely to have a stable nonzero f . the origin of this effect is clear. Although β−rewiring maintains the average degree of the network, the probability of two neighbors of an agent to be themselves neighbors decreases. Therefore it becomes increasingly difficult for reciprocators to find local consensus for the punishment of S-agents.
The average probability of two R-neighbors of a network node in S to be themselves neighbors, is called the (relative) clustering coefficient,
# {Γ i ∩ R} 2 being the maximum possible number of links between the R-neighbors of S-agent i. The network clustering coefficient is related to the notion of transitivity used in the sociological literature. For the β−rewiring model, the clustering may be estimated from the number Φ of shortcuts which in this case is proportional to β [16] .
Therefore a mean field version of the agent model may be written as follows
Notice the term f k in C β (Φ, f k) and in the cost of punishment term in Π ′ S . It reflects the fact that neighborhood relations for reciprocators are to computed on their subnetwork of size f N.
b (σ) is as in Eq.(3) with σ S being computed to minimize
This mean field version gives results identical to the agent-based model. Clustering appears therefore as the determining network parameter driving the evolution of the reciprocator trait.
Conclusions
1 -With a structure of small groups with collective monitoring of the agents' activities, the fitness difference between groups with a sizable amount of reciprocators and those where they have disappeared, makes the emergence of the strong reciprocity trait a likely event.
However rather than being completely invaded by reciprocators, maintenance of a certain amount of self-interested types is also likely, which only cooperate for fear of being punished. If, at a later stage, the social structure changes, they may be a source of instability and invade the population.
2 -In a large population, monitoring of the public goods behavior of the agents cannot be a fully collective activity, rather being the chore of those in close contact with the free-riders. Punishment of free-riders also requires a certain amount of local consensus among reciprocators. Therefore the clustering nature of the society may play an important role in the maintenance and evolution of the reciprocator trait.
Maybe the indifferent passersby that let the poor guy be mugged are not yet homo oeconomicus. Maybe they are just reciprocators in the middle of strangers with whom they do not communicate nor trust. A clustering problem.
3 -Culturally-inherited traits may have a much faster dynamics than gene-based ones. Modern societies are "small worlds" in the sense of short path lengths but not necessarily in the sense of also maintaining a high degree of clustering. Therefore if the reciprocator trait has a high cultural component, it may very well happen that, eventually, we will see homo oeconomicus leaving the benches of economy classes for a life on the streets.
